![]() ![]() Chinese officials reacted to the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002 by saying that they would compensate as necessary. The US Sentinel (and particularly the Safeguard) missile defense systems in the 1960s and 1970s were partly intended to defend against Chinese ICBMs. Overcoming potential effects of missile defenses: Chinese planners are likely concerned that increasingly capable missile defenses could undermine China’s retaliatory capability. This action-reaction dynamic is most likely a factor in China’s current modernization. By increasing the number of silos, more ICBMs could potentially survive a surprise attack and be able to launch their missiles in retaliation. Road-mobile launchers are less vulnerable, but they’re not invulnerable. According to the US Central Intelligence Agency, China’s decision to develop the modern road-mobile ICBMs we see today was a reaction to the US Navy’s deployment of Ohio-class Trident ballistic missile submarines in the Pacific. The previous small number of fixed silos have long been seen as particularly vulnerable. Reducing the vulnerability of China’s ICBMs to a first strike: China is concerned that its nuclear deterrent is too vulnerable to a US (or Russian) surprise attack. In all these cases, it is important to remember that Chinese planning is not solely occupied with the United States, but also what Russia and increasingly India are doing: The decision to do so has probably not been caused by a single issue but by a combination of factors. However, building nearly 300 silos is certainly new. It is estimated that China currently has about 20 silos for the old (but modified) liquid-fuel DF-5 ICBM. ![]() Why is China building so many silos? Missile silos are nothing new for China, which has deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in silos since the early 1980s. ![]() In addition to these four projects, open-source researchers noted in 2020 that China might also be building a small number of silos near its traditional missile silo area near Checunzhen (Sundian) in the Henan Province.Īll told, these discoveries indicate that China might be constructing nearly 300 new missile silos. Each missile silo field appears to include a number of other facilities that might be launch-control centers, bases, and support facilities.Ĭonstruction of the Yumen, Hami, and Ordos missile silo fields follow shortly after construction began of half a dozen silos that we discovered at the PLARF training site near Jilantai in Inner Mongolia, initially described in September 2019 and reported expanding further in February 2021. The Ordos field, which began construction in April or May 2021, has a different layout and so far only appears to include about 40 silos (it could potentially grow later). Construction of the Hami field began in February 2021 and might eventually include 110 silos. The Yumen field began construction in March 2020 and appears to include 120 silos. The three sites are in different stages of construction. The third field near Ordos (Hanggin Banner) was disclosed by a military research unit at Air University in mid-August. The second field near Hami was disclosed by the Federation of American Scientists in late-July. The first missile silo field near Yumen was disclosed by the Middlebury Institute in late-June. (Some have even suggested they are not silos, but windmills.) But the satellite imagery that we have analyzed, combined with US government officials issuing apparent confirmations ( here, here, and here), indicate that the construction involves hundreds of missile silos. How many silos are under construction? The Chinese government has made no official public announcement about what it is building, and the nature, scale, and role of the suspected missile silos remains uncertain. The development requires all sides to think hard about what it means for Chinese nuclear policy, how it plans to operate its nuclear forces, how other nuclear-armed states will or should respond, and what the international nuclear nonproliferation and arms control community can and should do to reduce nuclear risks. Most will probably use the disclosure to reaffirm existing beliefs. ![]()
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