![]() In our experiments, we consider both protocols with the remaining NIST finalist signature schemes and KEMs, except for Classic McEliece which has too large public keys. These implementations are based on the popular WolfSSL embedded TLS library and hence share a majority of their code. To gain meaningful results, we present implementations of KEMTLS and TLS 1.3 on a Cortex-M4-based platform. In this work, we compare KEMTLS to TLS 1.3 in an embedded setting. The KEMs considered for standardization are more efficient in terms of computation and/or bandwidth than the post-quantum signature schemes. Instead, it authenticates the peers through long-term KEM keys held in the certificates. KEMTLS is a proposal for an alternative TLS handshake protocol that avoids authentication through signatures in the TLS handshake. Dilithium suffers from very large public keys and signatures while Falcon has significant hardware requirements for efficient implementations. However, especially for small microcontrollers, it appears the current NIST post-quantum signature finalists pose a challenge. With the first PQC standards around the corner, TLS will have to be updated soon. standardization body NIST is currently in the process of concluding a multi-year search for promising post-quantum signature schemes and key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). ![]() This threat has led to the development of post-quantum cryptography (PQC). However, the public key cryptosystems currently used within TLS may soon be obsolete as large-scale quantum computers, once realized, would be able to break them. It secures transport for high-end desktops and low-end embedded devices alike. TLS is ubiquitous in modern computer networks. ![]()
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